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OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
A jury found Tyrone Greene guilty of possessing a 
firearm and ammunition in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), 
and the District Court sentenced him to sixty months in prison. 
Greene appeals his judgment of conviction, claiming the 
District Court erred when it denied two of his motions to 
suppress. We will affirm.  
I 
Greene and his girlfriend, Jennifer Manley, were 
traveling in a white van without its lights on when they were 
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stopped by Officer Mark Stefanowicz of the Hanover 
Township Police. Manley was driving, but she was unable to 
produce a driver’s license, vehicle registration, or proof of 
insurance. Instead, she gave Stefanowicz a New York state 
benefits card and a rental car agreement in the name of Kevin 
Hurtudo-Moreno that listed no other authorized drivers. 
Greene told Stefanowicz that Hurtudo-Moreno was his brother.  
While speaking with Manley and Greene, Stefanowicz 
smelled unburnt marijuana emanating from the vehicle. Greene 
then began acting suspiciously by “repeatedly seeking to leave, 
and attempting to leave, the scene of the traffic stop . . . 
initially standing up and then sitting back down in the 
passenger seat when ordered out of the vehicle; and standing 
up and reaching for his waistband, as though trying to conceal 
something on his person.” United States v. Greene, 2017 WL 
2180354, at *1 (M.D. Pa. May 18, 2017). Stefanowicz 
responded to Greene’s suspicious behavior by patting him 
down as permitted by Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). In 
doing so, Stefanowicz felt a bulge, the seal of a plastic baggie, 
and the texture of its contents. Based on his extensive 
experience, Stefanowicz immediately recognized the bag as 
marijuana, so he had no need to manipulate it. After removing 
the baggie, Stefanowicz placed Greene under arrest.  
Incident to Greene’s arrest, Stefanowicz searched the 
van and found .40 caliber bullets in the glove box and in 
Manley’s purse. Stefanowicz then escorted Greene to the 
police car, but while doing so, he noticed Greene bending over 
and walking in unusual ways, as if to conceal something. 
Another officer who had arrived on scene searched Greene 
further and located a loaded, stolen handgun in his groin area. 
The police arrested Manley and transported her to the 
stationhouse apart from Greene. 
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During booking at the stationhouse, Greene asked 
Stefanowicz whether Manley would get in trouble. 
Stefanowicz replied that she would, for “headlight violations, 
no license, marijuana.” App. 160. Greene then volunteered that 
he would “take the hit” for the gun and bullets. Id. 
As relevant to this appeal, Greene moved to suppress 
both his inculpatory statement and the gun and bullets seized 
after he was arrested for possession of marijuana. We address 
each argument in turn.  
II1 
During the booking process and before receiving any 
warning under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), 
Greene expressed concern for his girlfriend by asking whether 
Manley would get into trouble. Officer Stefanowicz responded 
curtly (and accurately) that Manley was facing charges for 
automobile and drug violations. Although Stefanowicz said 
nothing about firearm or ammunition charges, Greene 
volunteered that he would “take the hit” for the gun and bullets. 
App. 160. 
Greene argues that his inculpatory statement should 
have been suppressed because it was procured in violation of 
his Fifth Amendment right not to incriminate himself. That 
argument is premised on Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 
(1980), where the Supreme Court held that a suspect must be 
Mirandized before he is subjected to the functional equivalent 
of interrogation—i.e., “any words or actions on the part of the 
                                                 
1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3231. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 
U.S.C. § 3742(a).  
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police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and 
custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to 
elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.” Id. at 301 
(footnotes omitted). Greene cites our decisions in United 
States v. Calisto, 838 F.2d 711, 717 (3d Cir. 1988), and United 
States v. Benton, 996 F.2d 642, 644 (3d Cir. 1993), to argue 
that his circumstances amounted to the functional equivalent 
of interrogation. Neither case helps Greene. 
In Calisto, we found an officer’s remark about the 
possible arrest of the suspect’s daughter did not create a 
reasonable expectation that the suspect would make an 
inculpatory statement. 838 F.2d at 718. In that case, in front of 
the suspect, one officer informed another that both men’s and 
women’s clothing had been found in the bedroom where 
methamphetamine was found, and the second officer 
responded, “[w]ell, then we’ll have to get an arrest warrant for 
the daughter.” Id. at 713. We reasoned that the officers need 
not have expected the father’s inculpatory response because 
the officer’s comment was not directed at the father; it was the 
kind of remark officers normally make in the course of their 
duties; and it was not provocative. Id. at 713, 718. And because 
the father did not show any “signs of being emotionally upset 
or overwrought,” officers were not on notice that he would be 
particularly susceptible to such a remark. Id. at 718. 
In Benton, we held that an officer’s remark about seeing 
the armed robbery suspect dispose of his gun did not create a 
reasonable expectation that the suspect would make an 
inculpatory response. 996 F.2d at 643. The officer “did nothing 
more than tell [the suspect] why he was being arrested,” and 
the suspect’s response that no one saw him throw the gun away 
was unforeseeable. Id. at 644. Nevertheless, in dicta, we 
suggested that telling a suspect that other members of his 
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family would be implicated in the crime, “thus encouraging 
him to speak to accept sole responsibility,” might make the 
suspect feel “compelled to respond” and render his response 
excludable. Id. Greene mainly relies on this counterexample, 
and facts distinguishing his case from Calisto and Benton, to 
argue that his statement resulted from the functional equivalent 
of interrogation. 
Coercion is the touchstone for identifying 
circumstances that make an inculpatory statement excludable. 
See Innis, 446 U.S. at 301. Thus, an officer’s mere “words or 
actions” (as opposed to questions) may so coerce a suspect as 
to render his inculpatory response excludable. Id. We rely on 
the circumstances at the time a suspect made the incriminating 
statement to determine whether it resulted from the functional 
equivalent of interrogation. Benton, 996 F.2d at 644. And we 
review de novo “whether the police conduct found to have 
occurred constitutes custodial interrogation,” while reviewing 
factual findings for clear error. Calisto, 838 F.2d at 717. 
Here, Officer Stefanowicz’s remark did not constitute 
the functional equivalent of interrogation because Greene’s 
response was unforeseeable. See id. at 716. Greene asked for 
the information he now claims coerced him into confessing. 
Stefanowicz’s answer to Greene’s question was a brief and 
accurate description of what his girlfriend was facing. 
Moreover, the charges Manley faced were unrelated to the 
conduct—possessing the gun and bullets—to which Greene 
confessed. The record does not show Greene was “emotionally 
upset or overwrought,” id. at 718, or that other circumstances 
created such coercive influence that Stefanowicz should have 
known Greene would likely incriminate himself. Instead, 
Greene’s “statement was simply gratuitous,” and the District 
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Court did not err by declining to suppress it. Benton, 996 F.2d 
at 644. 
III 
Greene next claims the District Court erred when it 
denied his motion to suppress the gun and bullets, which he 
contends were the inadmissible fruits of an illegal pat-down. 
Under Minnesota v. Dickerson, police may seize contraband 
during a lawful pat-down if the contraband’s “contour or mass 
makes its identity immediately apparent.” 508 U.S. 366, 375 
(1993). This “plain-feel doctrine” permits an officer to seize an 
object when, given his training and experience, he develops 
probable cause to believe it is contraband (1) by the time he 
concludes it is not a weapon and (2) “in a manner consistent 
with a routine frisk.” United States v. Yamba, 506 F.3d 251, 
257, 259 (3d Cir. 2007).  
Here, Officer Stefanowicz, based on his extensive 
experience in drug investigations, identified a bag of marijuana 
in Greene’s pocket during a lawful pat-down. He did not 
manipulate the bulge—and had no need to do so—because he 
immediately recognized it by its feel and texture. See id. at 260. 
This occurred during a lawful Terry pat-down before the 
officers determined whether Greene was armed. See United 
States v. Graves, 877 F.3d 494, 500 (3d Cir. 2017). For these 
reasons, the District Court did not err when it denied Greene’s 
motion to suppress the gun and bullets found during a search 
incident to his arrest for marijuana possession.  
8 
 
* * * 
Police lawfully obtained Greene’s incriminating 
statement as well as the gun and bullets that supported his 
conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). We will affirm. 
